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HANNAH L. BUXBAUM*

Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution

of Jurisdictional Conflict
Ever-increasinggaps and overlaps in the national regulation of
cross-borderevents challenge territorialsovereignty as the conceptual
basisfor rules on legislativejurisdiction.At the same time, the work of
scholars in a range of disciplines, including internationalrelations
and criticalgeography, has complicated our understandingof the relationship between territory and power in the age of globalization. As
a result, emerging models of jurisdictional theory are moving away
from territory,and territoriallybased concepts of regulatorypower, as
the basis for defining legislative authority. What risks being overlooked in this shift is the critical step between re-thinking the
construction of territory and rejecting the salience of territoriality to
jurisdictionalframeworks. While territorialcontacts may function as
simple factual inputs in jurisdictional analysis, "territoriality"and
"extraterritoriality"are legal constructs-claims made by particular
actors, and assessed by particularinstitutions, within particularlegal
systems. The meaning of such claims is therefore dependent upon the
local practices and understandings of specific regimes. This Article
uses a case study of the role of territory in U.S. and German competition law to uncover differences in those systems that affect their
respective constructions of territoriality.It argues that local legal and
institutionalframeworks remain relevant in the transitionfrom traditional conflicts models to newer regulatory strategies, and that the
process of integrating criticalreconceptualizationsof territoryinto jurisdictionaltheories must account for differences in those frameworks
across regimes.
INTRODUCTION

In his 1964 Hague lectures, F.A. Mann sketched out the foundation of modern jurisdictional law in the following terms:
* Professor of Law and Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington. Thanks to James Pfander and the
other participants at the Michigan-Illinois Comparative Law Work-in-Progress Workshop for their comments and observations, and to David Gerber for his comments on
an earlier draft. This work was supported in part by a research grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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Jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty, it is coextensive with
and, indeed, incidental to, but also limited by, the State's
sovereignty. As Lord Macmillan said, "it is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign
independent States, that it should possess jurisdiction over
all persons and things within its territorial limits and in all
cases, civil and criminal, arising within these limits". If a
State assumed jurisdiction outside the limits of its sovereignty, it would come into conflict with other States which
need not suffer any encroachment upon their own sovereignty .... Such a system seems to establish a satisfactory
regime for the whole world. It divides the world into compartments within each of which a sovereign State has
jurisdiction. Moreover, the connection between jurisdiction
and sovereignty is, up to a point, obvious, inevitable, and almost platitudinous, for to the extent of its sovereignty a
State necessarily has jurisdiction.'
This passage captures the triangular relationship of three concepts: territory, sovereignty, and jurisdiction. Statehood is
articulated by reference to a particular geographic territory; jurisdiction, in the sense of a sovereign's authority over persons or events, by
reference to their location within that territory. This model long
served as the basis for rules on legislative, or prescriptive, jurisdiction. The factual links between particular conduct and a given
territory, or between the effects of that conduct and a given territory,
determined a state's lawmaking authority over the conduct.
In the current era, the reliance on territorial factors in determining the scope of a country's legislative jurisdiction has been called
into question. This is due primarily to the increasing complexity and
diffusion of the transactions and events that trigger jurisdictional inquiry. Regulators and courts must grapple not only with cross-border
transactions, or with acts of multinational enterprises, but also with
events that can be characterized as occurring nowhere (in cyberspace) or everywhere (on interconnected global markets). The
resulting gaps and overlaps in transnational regulation have led
scholars working in a variety of substantive areas to propose alternative methods of regulating cross-border commerce-methods that
reject territorial contacts as the basis for allocating regulatory jurisdiction. For instance, in the area of securities regulation and
insolvency, some authors have advocated increased deference to
party autonomy, arguing that companies should be free to choose the

1. Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, 111
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 30 (1964-I) (internal citations omitted).
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regulatory regime governing their conduct. 2 In the area of corporate
social responsibility, scholars have promoted the Alien Tort Claims
Act, which vests U.S. courts with jurisdiction over certain acts despite their lack of territorial connection with the United States, as a
means of addressing egregious human rights violations. 3 And an
early article on the topic of cyberspace regulation argued that
"[s]eparated from doctrine tied to territorial jurisdictions, new rules
will emerge to govern a wide range of new phenomena .... 14
Many of these proposals focus primarily on the lack of functionality of territory-based jurisdictional theories in today's economy. Some
commentators, however, have engaged more broadly with the project
of re-theorizing the relationship between territory and jurisdictional
authority in the age of globalization.5 That project connects with the
work of scholars in a wide range of other disciplines-work that questions traditional conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty.
International relations theorists, for instance, have challenged the
continuing viability of the Westphalian model of sovereignty, arguing
that defining sovereignty primarily as exclusive control over particular territory fails accurately to capture the source and extent of
governmental power. 6 Similarly, sociologists and critical geographers
have inspected the meaning of territory, questioning its construction
2. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) (legislative jurisdiction in securities regulation); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 48-50 (2002) (same); Robert K.
Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1

(1997) (insolvency).
3. See, e.g., Mayo Moran, An Uncivil Action: The Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law, in TORTURE AS TORT 661 (Craig Scott ed. 2001).
4. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501
(2005) (challenging the idea "that American law is somehow tethered to territory," id.
at 2550, and arguing for the adoption of a presumption against a spatialized reading
of laws' scope); KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? TERRITORIALITY AND EXTRATERRITORLALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009 forthcoming); Ralf
Michaels, Territorial JurisdictionAfter Territoriality,in GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105 (Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004) (describing globalization's
challenges to territoriality and considering a variety of possible responses in jurisdictional theory); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 311 (2002) (hereinafter Berman, Globalizationof Jurisdiction)(noting that "the
idea of legal jurisdiction both reflects and reinforces social conceptions of space, distance, and identity," id. at 319, and proposing a "cosmopolitan pluralist" theory of
jurisdiction based on community definition). See also Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory
(A History of Jurisdiction),97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999).
6. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); STEVEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY

(1999);

POLITICAL SPACE: FRONTIERS OF CHANGE

AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Yale H. Ferguson & R.J. Barry Jones
eds., 2002) (including essays addressing the adaptation of regulatory power in the age
of globalization).
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in exclusively physical-geographic terms. 7 These studies disrupt settled understandings of the individual components on which the
traditional model of legislative jurisdiction is based, and therefore intersect with legal scholarship that questions the role of territory in
that model. Such scholarship goes beyond calls to reject formalistic
approaches based on territorial factors and makes a second, more
radical move, seeking to ground the concept of jurisdiction in an entirely different theoretical foundation. Paul Berman, characterizing
an assertion of jurisdiction as "part of an international process of
community definition and norm creation," presents a "cosmopolitan"
model of jurisdiction:
A cosmopolitan approach allows us to think of community
not as a geographically determined territory circumscribed
by fixed boundaries, but as "articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings." This dynamic
understanding of the relationship between the "local" community and other forms of community affiliation (regional,
national, transnational, international, cosmopolitan) permits us to conceptualize legal jurisdiction in terms of social
interactions that are fluid processes, not motionless demarcations frozen in time and space. A court in one country
might therefore appropriately assert community dominion
over a legal dispute even if the court's territorially based
contacts with the dispute are minimal. Conversely, a country
that has certain "contacts" with a dispute might nevertheless be unable to establish a tie between a local community
and a distant defendant sufficient to justify asserting its
dominion.8
In fundamental ways, then, the growing literature on jurisdiction and globalization moves away from territory, and territory-based
concepts of regulatory power, as the basis for defining the scope of
lawmaking authority.
What risks being overlooked in this project of reassessing the
theory of legislative jurisdiction is what happens in the critical step
between re-thinking the construction of territory and rejecting the salience of territoriality to jurisdictional frameworks. In traditional
7. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AuTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
(2006); Saskia Sassen, Territory and Territoriality in the

GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES

Global Economy, 15 INT'L Soc. 372 (2000) (distinguishing globalization's impact on
national territory from its impact on the exclusive territoriality of nation-states);
NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); Sally
Engle Merry, InternationalLaw and Sociolegal Scholarship:Toward a Spatial Global
Legal Pluralism,41 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 149 (2008); Andrea Brighenti, On Territory
as Relationship and Law as Territory, 21 No. 2 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 65 (2006) (advocating a relational rather than spatial conception of territory).
8. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction,supra note 5, at 322.
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jurisdictional analysis, territory figures simply as a factual input in
the process of identifying the links between certain states and certain
acts or actors. "Territoriality" and "extraterritoriality," though, are
legal constructs. They are claims of authority, or of resistance to authority, that are made by particular actors with particular
substantive interests to promote. Thus, those harmed by anti-competitive conduct may invoke the concept of "objective territoriality" to
argue that the location of that conduct's effects within a particular
country is sufficient to give that country jurisdiction to regulate; the
government of a nation in which defendant corporations are located,
conversely, may invoke the concept of "extraterritoriality" to argue
that the regulating country would overstep its authority if it applied
its laws to foreign conduct. Moreover, these claims of authority or resistance are heard, and acted upon, by particular institutions within
particular states. In some cases, that might be a national court considering legislative jurisdiction in the context of a private lawsuit; in
others, a regulatory authority weighing a possible penalty on unlawful conduct. The meaning of such claims is therefore constructed
within individual legal regimes, and must be understood as contingent upon the specific legal and institutional frameworks in which
they are embedded. The risk in the move away from territory-based
jurisdictional standards is that territoriality may be cast in monolithic terms, eliding the various localized practices and
understandings that inform its content.
This Article proceeds by means of a case study of U.S. and German law on legislative jurisdiction in the antitrust arena. It has two
primary aims. The first is to provide a rich account of a particular
substantive context in which claims of territoriality or extraterritoriality are relevant, in order to identify more specifically the role those
claims play in jurisdictional analysis and the purposes for which they
are deployed in regulatory contests. Thus, Part I begins by examining
both systems' traditional doctrinal reliance on territoriality as the basis of jurisdiction over competition law claims. Part II then turns to
the question of how to resolve the conflicts that arise when more than
one country has a jurisdictional basis to regulate certain conduct.
This part examines more closely the sources from which the respective systems draw the norms that delimit the scope of regulatory
authority.
The Article's second aim is to uncover some of the specific conceptual and institutional features of the two systems that affect their
respective understandings of territoriality. Here, the analysis focuses
on aspects such as the role of public international law in the two systems, and the balance of public and private enforcement mechanisms
within the respective regimes. The Article concludes that territory,
and territorial limits, are quite differently constructed in the two le-
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gal systems. While the U.S. approach relies heavily on private
international law concepts in defining the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction, German courts and commentators view the problem through
two very different lenses-public international law and international
enforcement law. As a result, claims of territoriality and extraterritoriality resonate differently in the two systems.
The Article concludes by emphasizing the importance of local
norms and local institutions to jurisdictional analysis. That local context informs the significance of territoriality, and therefore remains
salient in the transition from traditional conflicts models to more effective global regulatory strategies. In addition, the process of
integrating critical reconceptualizations of territory into theories of
jurisdiction must account for local context if those theories are to acquire normative power in the international arena.

I.

DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS: TERRITORIALITY AS A BASIS
FOR LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

In the first instance, territoriality functions within the jurisdictional context as the conceptual foundation of regulatory authority
over transactions or conduct. 9 Historically, in its strictest sense, the
concept referred to the exclusive authority of a state to regulate
events occurring within its borders. 10 On this understanding, a claim
of territorial jurisdiction was irrefutable and unproblematic in that it
rested on conduct occurring within the regulating state and, by definition, could not overlap with a competing claim by another
country.1 1 Over the course of the twentieth century, the concept expanded to include authority over certain conduct that took place
elsewhere but whose effects were felt within the regulating state. As
the analysis below suggests, this expansion was recognized in substantially similar ways in most systems; thus, while the content of
"territoriality" changed, it did so in a way that remained more or less
compatible in most legal regimes.12
9. While international law recognizes other bases of jurisdiction, including nationality, territoriality was traditionally recognized as the primary basis, particularly
in the area of economic regulation. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (7th ed. 2008).
10. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 19, 21 (Arno
Press ed. 1972) (1834) ("[E]very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and juris-

diction within its own territory;" "[Ilt would be wholly incompatible with the equality
and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of any nation, that other nations should be at
liberty to regulate either persons or things within its territories.").
11. But see Michaels, supra note 5, at 110-11 (noting that this principle was never
so strictly construed).
12. The major outlier was the United Kingdom, which continued to insist that
territorial jurisdiction was present only when the conduct in question itself took place
within the regulating state. See A. Vaughan Lowe, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The
British Practice, 50 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES ULND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 157, 203 (1988): (".... United Kingdom practice is based upon the en-
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U.S. Law

In the United States, the law regarding legislative jurisdiction
has developed almost exclusively in judicial decisions, as the relevant
statutes are silent on the question of scope. The Sherman Act does
not contain a provision specifically addressing its jurisdictional reach
in cases with cross-border elements, 13 and the Clayton Act, which authorizes private lawsuits based on violations of the antitrust laws,
refers back to the Sherman Act for jurisdictional purposes. 14 While
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 198215 (FTAIA)
does address directly the question of legislative reach, it applies only
to export trade from the United States16 and therefore is not relevant
to many kinds of antitrust violations.
As within other systems, the traditional approach was to limit
legislative jurisdiction to conduct that took place within the borders
of the United States. 17 In the antitrust context, this view was best
captured in the early American Banana decision, in which Justice
Holmes discussed the territorial nature of law and then defined jurisdiction in terms of the location on particular territory of the relevant
conduct:
Law is a statement of the circumstances, in which the public
force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts
... . The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of
doubt, to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power ...
tirely proper perception that the world is made up of independent sovereign states in
each of which the government of the state is entitled to assert that it is its right, and
not that of any other state, to regulate the economy of the state concerned. The primacy of the territorial principle of jurisdiction asserted in British practice is a logical,
and arguably a necessary, inference from the fact of the co-existence of independent
states.")
13. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations." Section 2
states that it is illegal for any person, including entities organized under the laws of a
foreign country, "to monopolize any part of the trade of commerce ... with foreign
nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
15. Pub. L. 97-290, codified in part as 15 U.S.C. § 6(a).
16. The FTAIA does not address import trade or import commerce. It essentially
excludes from the Sherman Act's coverage export activities, and other activities taking place abroad, unless they adversely affect U.S. markets.
17. In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction ... All exceptions
therefore to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
8
the law of the country where the act is done.'
In the watershed 1945 opinion in Alcoa,19 the Second Circuit, sitting as the court of final appeal, adopted a more expansive view of
territoriality. Judge Hand stated that "it is settled law ...

that any

state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other
states will ordinarily recognize." 20 The "settled law" to which he referred, as extrapolated from the references he cited in that passage,
was not specific to the antitrust context. He drew primarily on a
handful of criminal cases, most of which addressed the circumstances
under which a principal could be found guilty of a crime whose component elements occurred partly within the regulating state, through
an accessory, and partly without. 2 ' It should be noted that these
cases involved local conduct that was seen to consummate the criminal act in question-and that therefore, following the terminology of
the 1935 Harvard Report on Jurisdiction, 2 2 justified jurisdiction on
the basis of "objective territoriality." This principle "establishes the
jurisdiction of the state to prosecute and punish for crimes com23
menced without the state but consummated within its territory."

18. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
19. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
20. Id. at 443.
21. Judge Hand cited Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911) (defendant indicted in Michigan for bribery where acts in question were carried out there by an
accessory), Lamar v. U.S., 240 U.S. 60 (1916) (defendant indicted for fraudulent impersonation carried out by telephone), and Ford v. U.S., 273 U.S. 593 (1927)
(defendants indicted for conspiracy to smuggle liquor into the United States where
acts in question were carried out in part within the United States by accessories and
in part by defendants on the high seas). The Strassheim case itself, interestingly,
cited American Banana for the proposition that a state can punish the cause of harm
"as if [the defendant] had been present at the effect." In the cited passage of American
Banana, however, the court referred only to universal jurisdiction, as in the case of
pirates, and jurisdiction in cases involving national interests. See generallyWilliam S.
Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism,39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 125-26 (1998) (discussing Alcoa as an example
of unilateral conflicts analysis).
22. Codification of International Law: Part II - Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime (Harvard Report on Jurisdiction), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Sup 437 (1935).
23. Id. at 484-87. See also id. at 488 (recognizing "subjective" and "objective" territoriality as two parts of a single concept, and stating that recognizing objective
territoriality "in no sense affirms or implies an extension of our laws beyond the territorial limits of the state."); David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: InternationalLaw
Restraintson the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 195 (1984) (distinguishing objective territoriality from the effects test, noting that objective
territoriality applies only when an act was consummated in the country in question).
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As one commentator noted in the 1950s, a difficulty arises in applying the "objective territoriality" doctrine outside of the criminal
area:
In relation to elementary cases of direct physical injury, such
as homicide,

. .

.the "effect" which is meant is an essential

ingredient of the crime. Once we move out of the sphere of
direct physical consequences, however, to employ the
formula of "effects" is to enter upon a very slippery slope; for
here the effects within the territory may be no more than an
element of alleged consequential damage which may be more
or less remote .... [I]t is clear from the authorities that the

objective application of the territorial principle is limited to
[situations in which] the crime was "consummated", viz.
completed, in the territory claiming jurisdiction .... [A] dif-

ferent conclusion would permit a practically unlimited
extension of the principle to cover almost any conceivable
24
situation.
Nevertheless, Alcoa did not distinguish between "local consequences" and a consummating act in violation of the antitrust laws,
in this sense. In introducing the notion that territorial jurisdiction
could rest simply on local effects, 2 5 it therefore laid the foundation for
the later development of an expansive effects doctrine.
Alcoa itself said little regarding the contours of the effects test,
but recognized that some limits must be present (in other words, not
every effect within the United States could be sufficient as a basis of
jurisdiction). 26 Later cases refined this approach, analyzing the quantum of local effects necessary to permit jurisdiction. The FTAIA,
while it does not apply directly to all forms of competition, includes a
provision that has been read as a general codification of the standard
in this area: effects on U.S. commerce must be "direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable." 27 Under U.S. law, then, a claim of"territoriality" can be based either on local conduct or on sufficient local
effects.

24. See R.Y. Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 159-60 (1957).
25. See id. at 165 (describing this as a "startling projection of the objective test of

territoriality").
26. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2004). The guidelines governing public enforcement of anti-

trust law in cross-border cases also confirm that the antitrust laws will be enforced in
cases involving "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effects. U.S. Dept. of

Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
guidelin.htm.
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German Law

Unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the German competition
statute speaks directly to the question of its own scope. The Law
Against Restraints on Competition (GWB) provides that the act "applies to all restraints of competition having an effect within the
territorial scope of this Act, even if they are caused outside the territorial scope of this act."' 28 This provision expresses the legislative

intent to adopt anti-competitive effects within Germany as a sufficient basis for prescriptive jurisdiction-indeed, to adopt effects as
the only acceptable basis for jurisdiction. 29 Modern German competition law therefore begins approximately where the Alcoa case begins
in the U.S. system.
The seemingly unlimited nature of the effects principle articulated in § 130 (2) necessitates further interpretation of the legislative
intent concerning its application. As David Gerber has pointed out,
the provision sets forth a "pure" effects doctrine: it contains no limitations on the nature or significance of the effects necessary to support
the exercise of jurisdiction. 30 The foundational studies of German law
on international competition, by Ivo Schwartz 3 1 and Eckard
Rehbinder, 32 recognized that some limits would be necessary in order
to prevent insignificant effects from triggering the application of German law. German lawmakers thus embarked on the same project as
their counterparts in the United States: seeking to establish more
concretely the quantity or quality of effects that would be sufficient to
trigger legislative jurisdiction.
Early scholarship argued for a form of statutory interpretation
that focused on the specific protection of competition articulated in
28. GWB § 130(2). See generally

IMMENGA/MESTMACKER,

GWB: KOMMENTAR ZUM

§ 130 Abs. 2, 2-6 (discussing the legislative history of the section).
The provision was originally adopted as § 98(2), and was renumbered as § 130(2) in
the Sixth Amendment of the GWB in 1998. Sechstes Gesetz zur Anderung des
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrainkungen, Gazette of the Federal Council
(Bundesratsdrucksache) 418 (May 8, 1998). The GWB has since been further
amended; see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
29. In other words, anti-competitive conduct that takes place within Germany but
does not create adverse effects there would not fall within the statute's scope. In the
Oilfield Pipes case, BGH 12 July 1973, WuW/E BGH 1276, the Bundesgerichtshof
verified that § 130(2) rested only on the basis of effects-that conduct within the territory of Germany was an insufficient jurisdictional basis in the absence of anticompetitive effect within the country. See discussion in Helmut Steinberger, The German Approach, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAwS AND RESPONSES THERETO
77, 81-82 (Cecil J. Olmstead ed., 1984).
30. David J. Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust
Laws, 77 Am.J. IN'L L. 756, 761 (1983) (hereinafter Gerber, German Antitrust).
31. Ivo E. ScHwARTz, DEUTSCHES INTERNATIONALES KARTELLRECHT (1962).
32. ECKARD REHBINDER, EXTRATERRITORIALE WIRKUNGEN DES DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHTS (1965).
KARTELLGESETZ
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each particular provision of the GWB. 33 Thus, rather than trying to
define a single threshold for effects jurisdiction, this method suggested a more particularized analysis in which the quantum of effects
necessary to trigger regulation would differ according to the particular kind of competition violation involved. 34 A 1973 decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof adopted this approach, clearing the way for a
more differentiated application of the GWB in cases involving foreign
conduct. 35 Subsequently, in the various areas of competition regula-

tion (horizontal restraints, vertical restraints, abuse of dominant
position, and later merger control), 36 cases and commentary developed specific thresholds to define effects that were substantial
enough to support jurisdiction. 3 7 In a case involving merger control,
for instance, the Bundesgerichtshof held that the effect of a planned
merger on local competitive conditions must be "direct" and "substantial" in order to justify the application of German law. 38 To generalize
from the tests developed in different areas of competition law, domestic effects must be direct, considerable,3 9 actual, and foreseeable in
order to support legislative jurisdiction.
The legal landscape in Germany has of course been affected by
the communitarization of competition law. EU competition law has to
a significant extent displaced the national competition regimes of European Union member states, although national law does remain
applicable to transactions and events that do not have a community
dimension. EU law too recognizes legislative jurisdiction based on the
local consequences of foreign conduct, as indicated in the 1993 Wood
Pulp decision. 40 That case involved price-fixing agreements among
33. See, e.g., id. For fuller discussion of this method, see Gerber, German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 764.
34. Thus, where the U.S. system refers to "general economic effects caused by the
anticompetitive conduct," the German approach looks for effects that interfere with
specific protections of competition. Gerber, German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 780-

81.
35. BGH 12 July 1973, WuW/E BGH 11276 (Oilfield Pipes) (concluding that only
domestic effects which actually violate the "scope of protection" of the particular substantive provision in question would trigger application of the GWB).
36. DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 279 (1998).
37. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 31.
38. BGH 29 May 1979, WuW/E BGH 1613 (Organic Pigments). See also Gerber,
GermanAntitrust, supra note 30, at 768-69 (discussing the decision and noting that
the court did not provide additional guidance on the interpretation of these limits).
39. IMMENGA/MESTMACKER, supra note 28, at § 130 Abs. 2 2708 (n.27); see also
WERNER MENG, EXTRATERRITORIALE

JURISDIKTION IM OFFENTLICHEN WIRTSCHAFr-

SRECHT 403-04 (1993) (discussing the level of effects necessary to trigger application of
various provisions of the GWB). Guidelines later adopted by the Federal Cartel Office
for use in merger approvals reflected this approach as well. See also Steinberger,
supra note 29, at 93, characterizing § 130(2) as requiring "considerable and foreseeable" effects on the German market.
40. Case 89/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtib v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R.

901 (1988).
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producers of wood pulp; the agreements were made outside the European Community, but their result was to affect the market for the
product within the Community. The defendants had argued that any
application of EU competition law in the case would rest "exclusively
[on the basis of! the economic repercussions within the common market of conduct . . . adopted outside the Community," and would

therefore exceed that law's jurisdictional scope. 4 1 The Court responded by characterizing the conduct in question as involving two
separate elements: the formation of the relevant agreement and its
implementation. The "decisive factor," it held, was the place of implementation; 4 2 and applying European competition law to conduct
implemented within the Community "is covered by the territoriality
principle as universally recognized in public international law." 43 In
this manner, the European Court of Justice framed the issue as one
of objective territoriality, requiring a consummating act occurring
within the Union. Because it took a very broad view of what constituted implementation, however, the decision has been widely read as
accepting, albeit on the basis of a different rationale than that
adopted in the United States, effects-based jurisdiction over foreign
44
conduct.
Up to this point, while the method used in Germany to define
adequate effects differs from that used in the United States, the results are analogous. Both systems recognize local effects as a valid
basis for jurisdiction over anti-competitive conduct. Both systems establish reasonable thresholds as triggers for their own regulatory
interest. And while the United States, unlike Germany, also recognizes local conduct as a valid basis for jurisdiction, conduct with no
local effects would present no regulatory interest to spur the application of U.S. law. Thus, the systems share an understanding of
"territoriality" as used to justify a claim of jurisdictional authority.
II.

THE "EXTRATERRITORIALITY"

PROBLEMATIC: CLAIMS OF

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT

Once effects-based jurisdiction is recognized, it is clear that situations may arise in which more than one nation has an interest in
regulating the conduct or transaction in question. A country in which
the relevant conduct takes place, particularly if the actors are its citi41. Id. at T 15.
42. Id. at 9 16.
43. Id. at 9118.
44. See Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 38 (1992)
("While the theoretical rationale of the implementation approach is distinct from the
effects doctrine, there are striking similarities as to their practical consequences.").
Like U.S. antitrust law, European competition law applies only when the effects in
question reach a certain threshold, although the precise articulation of that threshold
is slightly different in the two systems. See id. at 40-41.
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zens, may feel that its regulatory interest should trump that of
another country. This potential for regulatory conflict generates the
next question: should the scope of a country's jurisdiction be limited
when competing interests are present? If so, how should those limits
be defined? It is on this point that the U.S. system diverges from
other legal systems. That divergence has created a significant substantive conflict regarding jurisdictional approaches, and has fed the
development of "extraterritoriality" as an expression of resistance to
certain claims of regulatory authority. Claims of extraterritoriality
work in part to recast the jurisdictional analysis: rather than focusing on the location of the relevant effects-which, as previously
described, can be characterized as a legitimate basis for the exercise
of jurisdiction-they focus on the (foreign) location of the relevant
conduct, thereby implying an excess of jurisdictional reach.
This Part begins by describing the evolution of the U.S. approach
to conflicts of competition law, highlighting two important aspects of
that approach: first, its rejection of international law as a relevant
framework; and second, its emphasis on private-law norms. It then
compares that approach to the German approach, identifying some
fundamental differences in the understanding of extraterritoriality.
A.

The U.S. Approach to Resolving Conflicts of Competition Law

As previously outlined, the 1945 decision in Alcoa concluded that
effects within the territory of the United States constituted a valid
basis of legislative jurisdiction. In considering the possible limitations on jurisdictional reach, the court started here:
we are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of
persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the
liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to
do so: as a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond
our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to
read general words, such as those in [the Sherman Act],
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by
nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which
generally correspond to those fixed by the "Conflict of
45
Laws."
This passage contains two important interpretive steps. First, it
frames the question of legislative scope as one of domestic rather
than international law. It is noteworthy in this regard that Judge
Hand did not cite the 1927 decision of the Permanent Court of Justice
45. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
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in the Lotus case, 4 6 which held as a general matter that jurisdiction

based on effects did not violate international law. 4 7 Thus, rather than
positioning the issue against the backdrop of international law, the
court positions it as a matter of statutory interpretation, with the

outer boundary of prescriptive jurisdiction defined by the U.S. Constitution. 48 Second, turning to the task of statutory construction, the
court looks to domestic private law for guidance in establishing where

Congress intended that outer boundary to lie. The court does make
an initial reference to international law-the phrase "limitations customarily observed by nations" suggests attention to customary
international law principles-but then turns immediately to conflicts
law, which is domestic law, not international, and private law, not

public. 49 This orientation has significantly affected the subsequent
development of U.S. law regarding the regulation of competition in
situations of conflict with other nations.
The first step is consistent with the hierarchy of legal sources in

the United States, under which Congress is not barred from enacting
statutes inconsistent with international law. 50 Under such circumstances, U.S. courts are bound to effectuate the intent of Congress
even when a violation of international law would result. 5 1 It does not
follow, of course, that Congress would lightly violate international
law; indeed, at the time Alcoa was decided, the so-called "Charming
Betsy" presumption-that Congress should be assumed not to violate
international law unless no other construction of its intent is possible 52 -had long been in place. Alcoa did not cite this presumption,
however.
46. Lotus, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.J. Series A, No. 10, p. 19.
47. See discussion in Harold G. Maier, JurisdictionalRules in Customary International Law, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64, 67

(Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996). The Lotus court did imply that that such jurisdiction
required an accommodation of other countries' competing interests, as I will discuss
in more detail infra.
48. And the Constitution has in fact been the subject of "inattention" as a potential limitation on the extraterritorial application of federal law. See Lea Brilmayer,
The ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 24-25 (1987).
49. At the time of the Alcoa decision, the influence on U.S. conflicts jurisprudence
of its international law roots was stronger than in later years; nevertheless, writing a
few years before the Alcoa decision, Arthur Nussbaum noted that "[in ... American
private international law, the law-of-nations doctrine has never won a real foothold."
Arthur Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 197 (1942).
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115 (1987) (recognizing that the enactment of federal statutes may bring the
United States into violation of international law); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Ind. Co., 494 F.Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[I]nternational law must give
way when it conflicts with or is superseded by a federal statute... ).
51. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); see also Brilmayer, supra note 48, at 20.
52. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
See also EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (affirming the "long-
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The second step brings the court to conflict-of-laws rules as the
means of identifying relevant limitations. The Alcoa court itself did
not discuss these principles in any detail: it simply cited the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and a handful of opinions, for the
proposition that acts done in one state might fall under the law of
another. 53 It neither recognized the primarily interstate focus of
much U.S. conflicts law (two of the three cases it cited were domestic
cases) 54 nor did it move on to the next question, which would be recognizing the choice-of-law problem that would result from an
assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of effects. 55 Thus, in Alcoa itself,
conflicts law appears less to provide a limitation on the reach of U.S.
laws than to articulate an enabling principle: conflicts law recognizes
jurisdiction based on acts that occur elsewhere. Thus, if acts would
have been unlawful had they occurred within the United States, then
they would be held unlawful, "though made abroad, if they were in56
tended to affect imports and did affect them."
Cases subsequent to Alcoa applied U.S. antitrust law to foreign
conduct with increasing regularity. Not surprisingly, this practice
generated conflict with other nations, as the countries in which that
conduct took place often asserted competing claims of jurisdictional
authority. That conflict generated various forms of protest, including,
most pointedly, blocking statutes. 5 7 In response, some courts in the
United States began to develop a new approach to the question of
legislative jurisdiction-an approach that sought to balance the interests of the United States and of other nations. It is in these cases
that the importance of the choices made in the Alcoa framework bestanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States"' (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). This question
of statutory construction was more recently addressed in a Supreme Court opinion
regarding the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the operations of a
foreign cruise line. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
53. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. The original Restatement of Conflict of Laws, then in
effect, states that "If consequences of an act done in one state occur in another state,
each state in which any event in the series of act and consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create rights or other interests as a result thereof."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 65 (1934).

54. The third, while it dealt with a conspiracy conviction of a person then out of
the United States, was based on criminal activity carried on within the jurisdiction of
the country. Ford v. U.S., 273 U.S. 593 (1927), cited in Alcoa.
55. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 53, at § 65 comment b: "Under the rule stated in this Section, it may and frequently does happen
that more than one state has legislative jurisdiction . . . the court at the forum must
select the law of one of the several states thus having legislative jurisdiction, to govern the case.".
56. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. See also Dodge, supra note 21, at 126-27 (describing
this approach as based on unilateral conflict-of-laws methods and noting consistency
with an earlier private-law case in which Judge Hand had espoused the local-law
conflicts approach).
57. See Alford, supra note 44, at 9-10 (describing the critical reception of effectsbased jurisdiction abroad and the enactment of blocking statutes in response).
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came apparent, as they imparted a particular orientation to the
extraterritoriality jurisprudence.
The "interest balancing" approach, which emerged in the 1970s,
added a second step to the jurisdictional analysis. Under this approach, courts must not only ascertain that the United States'
interest in regulating particular conduct is sufficient to trigger regulation, but must also assess whether it is sufficient as compared with
the competing interests of other states. The pre-eminent interest-balancing case, Timberlane, began its discussion of extraterritoriality by
noting:
That American law covers some conduct beyond this nation's
borders does not mean that it embraces all, however .... it
is evident that at some point the interests of the United
States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for
restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of
jurisdiction. 58
Following the Alcoa approach, however, the court then goes on to
say that "what that point is or how it is determined is not defined by
international law." 5 9 Rather, it cites "international comity and fairness" as the guidelines for this analysis. The court also cites, as
reflecting the same idea, Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law. That section asserts that states are required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of their jurisdiction; the Timberlane court describes that section
as "indicat[ing] that 'jurisdictional' forbearance in the international
setting is more a question of comity and fairness than one of national
power." 60 A subsequent case, Mannington Mills, made this point even
more explicitly: it stated that legislative jurisdiction clearly existed
over conduct having substantial effects in the United States, and
then discussed the question of how to account for competing sovereign interests in a passage entitled "comity, abstention and
61
international repercussions."
Under the heading not of international law but of "comity," then,
the Timberlane court introduced its innovation: an investigation of
"whether the interests of, and links to, the United States including
the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion
58. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (C.A. Cal.
1976).
59. Id. But see id. at 610-13, suggesting that international law is relevant. Cf.
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (international law not

relevant).

60. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609 n.27.
61. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (C.A.N.J.

1979).
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of extraterritorial authority." 62 Following Alcoa's focus on conflict of
laws, the court proposed specific elements to guide the jurisdictional
analysis that borrowed heavily from private choice-of-law
methodology:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effects, and the relative
within the
importance to the violations charged of conduct 63
abroad.
conduct
with
compared
as
States
United
In constructing this list, the court drew on influential scholarship that had proposed similar solutions. 64 In a 1961 article, Donald
Trautman noted the insufficiency of purely territorial analysis. 65 In
attempting to articulate standards that courts might apply in grappling with cases presenting actual conflicts with the regulatory
interests of foreign nations, he looked to choice of law. 6 6 He used it as
an analogy; in regulatory interpretation, as he recognized, the question is not which law to choose but simply whether domestic law
applies or not. 6 7 But the specific factors that he thought would be
useful to the analysis led him to suggest a "relative interests"-that
is, interest-balancing-test. Andreas Lowenfeld, in his 1979 Hague
Lectures, undertook a similar task. 68 In setting out a list of factors
relevant to the exercise of legislative jurisdiction, he "borrowed liberally" from the general guidelines articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. 69 The resulting list reflects these pri62. Timberlane, 549 F.2d, at 613.
63. Id. at 614.
64. The Timberlane court in particular drew on a proposed test articulated in
KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958)

(presenting it as a "jurisdictional rule of reason").
65. Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 592 (1961)
(". . . it has been found unworkable and irrational to decide jurisdictional competence
solely on the basis either of the location of the activity or the status of the persons
involved.").
66. "Once it is recognized that the problem may be to decide which of the statutes
of two or more countries should be applied to a particular case it is apparent that the
court faces a problem much like that dealt with in the conflict of laws. Choice-of-law
rules are designed to resolve precisely such problems." Id. at 616.
67. Id. at 617.
68. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of
Laws, InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL
DES CouRs 311 (1979-I).

69. Id. at 329.
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vate-law roots, including, in addition to classic connecting factors
such as "the territory in which the activity is principally carried on,"
such items as "the protection of justified expectations" and "the conflicts, if any, between the regulation in question and the potential
exercise of legislative jurisdiction pursuant to the authority of an'70
other State.
This approach is also embodied in the Restatement (Third) on
Foreign Relations Law, adopted in 1987, for which Professor
Lowenfeld served as reporter. Section 403(2) of that Restatement provides that after having established the existence of an appropriate
jurisdictional basis (including local conduct or local effects), a state
must then consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction on that basis
would be reasonable. The reasonableness analysis turns on a list of
factors that, as the Reporters' Notes explain, "adopt the factors listed
in

.

. the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws."7 1 Among them

are "the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity" and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state. '7 2 To address situations in which it would be reasonable for each of two states to regulate, Section 403(3) provides that a
state should defer to the other if the latter's interest is "clearly
greater. '73 Importantly, while relying upon private conflict-of-laws
methodology for its content, the drafters of the Restatement indicated
that the principle of reasonableness was to be understood "as a rule of
74
international law."

The Timberlane era reflects the high point of U.S. thinking about
how extraterritorial regulation might be limited in response to jurisdictional conflict. It is worth pausing, then, to consider what this
style of analysis means in terms of territoriality and sovereignty.
First, the interest-balancing method articulated in the Timberlane
line of cases recognizes no hard limits on the reach of domestic antitrust law to cross-border cases. International law, with its foundation
in sovereign equality, plays virtually no role in analysis of legislative
jurisdiction: when U.S. courts do look for principles to limit the legislative reach of domestic antitrust law, they begin with the notion of
comity, a softer starting point.75 (Although some commentators have
70. Id.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 50, at § 403
reporters' note 10.
72. Id., § 403(2)(g), (h).
73. Id. § 403(3).
74. Id., comment a; see also reporters' note 10 ("reasonableness is understood here
not as a basis for requiring states to consider moderating their enforcement of laws
that they are authorized to prescribe, but as an essential element in determining
whether, as a matter of international law, the state may exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe").
75. See Gerber, German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 781 (describing this as "essentially a discretionary political issue."); Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping
"InternationalComity," 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 925-31 (describing the consequences of a
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suggested that comity is in fact a principle of customary international
law, 76 the U.S. position remains that articulated in an 1895 decision,
which is that it lies between law and mere courtesy. 77 This view is
shared by the public agencies charged with application of U.S. antitrust law. 78 ) As a result, courts do not view a consideration of foreign
interests as mandated by international law. Consistent with this position, commentators have criticized the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law's reasonableness standard as simply aspirational, noting that it does not reflect U.S. understanding or practice
79
regarding the limits of legislative jurisdiction.
Second, the turn to the domestically-oriented system of conflicts
law as a guide to fleshing out what comity might entail in cases of
jurisdictional conflict has particular consequences related to the construction of territoriality. One consequence of that turn is simply
that, looking inward, it elevates domestic interests over international
considerations. As one commentator has noted, "[tihe perspective of
conflict of laws lies within a state. It is directed to domestic interests,
both public and private. Foreign interests are relevant only insofar as
they form part of the state's foreign policy, for instance, if they reflect
considerations of reciprocity."8 0 The focus on domestic interests
therefore diverts attention from the fact that applying forum law to
foreign conduct operates within the international arena as a claim of
regulatory authority vis-A-vis other sovereigns. Another consequence
comity analysis disconnected from international law). Cf. Rep. of Austria v. Altmann,
541 U.S. 677 (2004) (describing sovereign immunity as "a matter of grace and comity,"
not as a principle of international law).
76. See Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of InternationalLaw Revisited After
Twenty Years, 186 RECUElL DES COURS 19, 87 (1984).
77. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See also Maier, supra note 45, at 73
("Evidence of an international legal rule requiring this result is sparse"); Dodge,
supra note 21, at 139 ("international law does not require comparative interest balancing"). While the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations styles it as a principle of
customary international law, comity has to date not been viewed in that light by the
majority of U.S. commentators or by U.S. courts.
78. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, supra
note 27, at 3.2 (describing comity as "reflect[ing] the broad concept of respect among
co-equal sovereign nations").
79. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1149 (1990) ("The modern
reasonableness test.., has been hailed as progress of a sort, but not necessarily as an
accurate statement of international jurisdictional obligations. To the contrary, the Restatement (Third) has been criticized precisely because it seems to exceed precedent
and practice both in the United States and abroad."). This characterization is consonant with the Supreme Court's decision to reject reasonableness analysis in the
Hartford Fire Insurance case, discussed infra.
80. Gerber, GermanAntitrust, supra note 30, at 783, 790. See also Ralf Michaels,
The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge
from GlobalLegal Pluralism,51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1249 ("Since it has overcome its
grounding in international law, the perspective of conflict of laws is the perspective of
an individual state, not that of the entire global legal system or even the entire world
society.").
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flows from the particular orientation of U.S. choice-of-law methodology. Traditional conflicts theory is anchored in considerations of
territorial sovereignty, predicated on the assumption that the laws of
foreign states stand on equal footing with forum law, and that a legal
relationship should therefore be governed by the law of the jurisdiction to which it most closely relates.8 1 At the time that interest
balancing came into vogue, however, U.S. conflicts law was under the
influence of Brainerd Currie's "governmental interest analysis."8 2
That approach, unlike traditional Savignyian analysis, seeks not so
much to locate the proper seat of any given transaction, but rather to
identify and promote legislative policy interests.8 3 By focusing on the
strength and applicability of the governmental interest underlying
the private law in question, it reduces the importance of territorial
linkages. 8 4 As integrated into analysis of legislative scope, then, this
approach shifts attention away from the significance of territoriality
as a way of identifying and accommodating foreign interests.
For these reasons, even at the height of the interest-balancing
era, territoriality-both in the strict sense and in the sense of territorial sovereignty-did not play a major role in U.S. jurisprudence.
More importantly, the turn inward to choice-of-law methods encouraged U.S. courts to focus on the U.S. interests at stake and not on
the fact that application of law to foreign conduct is an act which
might undermine a foreign state's regulation of events within its own
territory.8 5 It thus downplayed the importance of territorial
sovereignty.
The heyday of interest balancing, in any event, was short. In
1993, the Supreme Court revisited the legislative reach of antitrust
law in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California.88 There, it held that
"the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States,"8 7 and that the only further jurisdictional question would be
whether "the principle of international comity" should lead courts in
particular circumstances to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.8 8 It
then conflated comity with the doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion, stating that unless the conduct in question was required by
81. See Schwartz & Basedow, infra note 152.
82. See generally Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171 (1959); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS (1963).
83. See Brilmayer, supra note 48, at 17-18.
84. See MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE
THROUGH THE JUNGLE 112-14 (1995) (contrasting this U.S. focus on public policies
with the more traditional European approach to conflicts).
85. See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L L. 487, 502-03 (1985).
86. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).

87. Id. at 796.
88. Id. at 797.
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another state, no "true conflict" of regulation was present.8

9

The re-

sult was to foreclose the consideration of competing foreign
interests-a consideration that, even if not required by international
law, would at least have been counseled by a comity-based
approach.9 0
What is most interesting for the purposes of this discussion is the
Court's rejection of an alternative analysis forwarded by Justice
Scalia in his dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia agreed that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to apply to foreign conduct at least in some
circumstances.9 1 However, he then sought to introduce a second layer
of analysis, addressed particularly to the jurisdictional conflict that
effects-based regulation presents. His opinion frames the analysis as
a matter of statutory construction, and in that sense follows Alcoa:
"'The law of nations,' or customary international law, includes limitations on a nation's exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe. Though it
clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally
presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law
limits on jurisdiction to prescribe." 9 2 Unlike Alcoa, however, which
briefly mentioned public international law but then turned for guidance to conflict-of-laws norms, Justice Scalia's opinion pointed
explicitly to the roots of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
and of comity analysis generally, in public international law. 93 Thus,
while he defers to the private conflict-of-laws based analysis that has
come to characterize U.S. law on this point, 9 4 his opinion looks to international law itself as the central point of reference: "the practice of
using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes
is firmly established in [U.S.] jurisprudence." 95 The majority's rejection of this approach was therefore a rejection of a more strongly
international orientation.
The most recent Supreme Court decision in international antitrust jurisdiction, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Empagran, again reflects
this debate about analytical approaches. In that case, the Court considered claims brought under the Sherman Act by plaintiffs who had
89. Id. This step in the analysis has drawn much criticism. See, e.g., Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the InsuranceAntitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 46 (1995).
90. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 563 (2000).
91. Hartford Fire Insurance, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 815 (internal citations omitted), citing Charming Betsy, supra note 52.
93. Id., referring to "the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting
the reach of their laws," and, citing Story, to "the true foundation and extent of the
obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another.".
94. This orientation is signaled in part by the fact that Justice Scalia does not cite
the Lotus case, which would have indicated a more direct reference to international
rather than domestic law.

95. Id. at 818.
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purchased price-fixed goods in transactions in foreign markets.9 6 In
addressing the question of the Act's legislative scope, contrary to its
posture in HartfordFire, the Court seems attuned to the public international law framework. It begins by citing the Charming Betsy
principle: "this Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations. '97 Then, following the approach outlined by Justice Scalia in
his dissenting opinion in the earlier case, the majority links this principle of construction directly to customary international law and "the
legitimate sovereign interests of other nations."9 8 Thus, the Court appears ready to import the salient international law concerns into its
analysis of the statute. 99
It is questionable how much to read into this decision, however,
as the Court in Empagran ultimately ducks the issue of how to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction. Separating the transactions occurring
within the United States from transactions occurring elsewhere, the
Court simply concludes that the case presented no domestic effects
and therefore no basis for asserting domestic legislative jurisdiction. 10 0 As a result, while it presents the intriguing possibility of a
shift toward a more international-law based approach, it does not ultimately undermine the holding in Hartford Fire regarding
consideration of foreign interests in cases of conflict. Indeed, one passage of the Court's opinion appears to endorse the earlier decision's
conclusion that where the requisite domestic effects are present, triggering a domestic legislative interest, no consideration of foreign
interests is required-whether by international law or otherwise. 10 '
B.

The German Approach to Resolving Conflicts of Competition
Law

As previously described, the German system, like the U.S. system, views the exercise of regulatory authority on the basis of local
96. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
97. Id. at 164. It should be noted that this is a sort of variation on the traditional
CharmingBetsy presumption, as it seeks to avoid not conflicts with international law,
but rather interference with foreign sovereign authority.
98. Id. at 164-65.
99. At one point the Court notes the need to help "the potentially conflicting laws
of different nations work together in harmony-a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world." Id. at 164-65.
100. Id. at 169.
101. Id. at 165 ("Application of [U.S.] antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is . . . reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity,
insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that
foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused."). Following a subsequent citation to
cases in which courts have taken "account of comity considerations case by case, abstaining where comity considerations so dictate," the Court suggests that such an
approach "is too complex to prove workable," suggesting that it remains committed to
the Hartford Fire Insurance approach in cases presenting domestic as well as foreign
effects. Id. at 168.
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effects as consistent with international law. However, it takes an entirely different approach to the question of whether legislative
jurisdiction should be limited in cases of actual or potential conflict
with the interests of another nation. As the research below suggests,
German courts and commentators view this problem through two
lenses-public international law and international enforcement
law-that magnify the importance of territoriality within the jurisdictional framework. As a result, the relationship between territory
and regulatory power is constructed differently in German jurisdictional law than in the U.S. system.
1. The International Law Lens
Article 25 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) places customary international law above domestic law in the hierarchy of
norms. 10 2 This means that the German legislature must not enact a
statute that violates customary law. 10 3 In the German system, then,
the entire process of interpreting the jurisdictional reach of statutory
law is seen from within the framework of international law. 10 4 Where
in the United States the inquiry is framed as one purely of statutory
construction, "concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach
liability,"1 0 5 in Germany, one commentator notes, it would simply be
inappropriate to discuss the statute's intended sphere of application
independent of international law limits. 1 0 6 For that reason, interna-

tional law considerations have dominated the discussion of
international competition regulation in Germany.' 0 7 International
law is seen within the German system as creating a strict, hard limit
on the legislative reach of a state, and much of the analysis in this
area therefore attempts to derive from public international law defin08
itive methods for resolving conflicts of regulatory jurisdiction.1
Importantly, the stronger link to public international law has kept
102. Article 25 provides that "The general rules of international law shall be an
integral part of federal law. They shall override laws and directly establish rights and
obligations for the inhabitants of the federal territory." DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

511 (2d ed.

1997) (translation of selected provisions of the Basic Law, Appendix A). International
treaties are addressed separately, in Article 59, which provides that "[tireaties which
regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to matters of federal legislation" require implementation by means of federal law. GG Art. 59(2) (translation in
KOMMERS at 511).
103. See generally Christian Koenig, in
ZUM GRUNDGESETZ,

MANGOLDT/KLEIN/STARCK,

KOMMENTAR

GG 25 Rdnr. 6-7 (2005) (discussing the status of "universal" but

also, possibly, regional customary international law as superior to statutory law).

104. See IMMENGA/MESTMACKER, supra note 28, at § 130 Abs. 2, 2704 (n.17).
105. See discussion supra at note 45 and accompanying text.
106. REHBINDER, supra note 32, at 30, 47.
107. See JUJRGEN BASEDOW, WELTKARTELLRECHT 29 (1998).
108. Gerber, German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 760. See also BERNHARD BECK,
UNTER
WETBEWERBSRECHTS
ANWENDUNG
NATIONALEN
DIE EXTRATERRITORIALE
BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG LANDEROBERGREIFENDER FusIONEN 77-79 (1986).
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notions of territory and Westphalian sovereignty at the forefront of
thinking about jurisdiction. 10 9
Even in assessing first principles under § 130(2) GWB-the viability of its second clause, stating that the GWB would be applied not
only to domestic but also to foreign conduct that caused domestic effects-German commentators on international antitrust turned to
public international law. Where in the United States the Alcoa court
approached the issue as a matter of statutory construction, in Germany the inquiry was whether, in general, international law
permitted nations to extend their legislative reach to conduct done
outside their territorial borders. Commentators turned first to the
Permanent Court of Justice's 1927 decision in the Lotus case. The
Court there held that "far from laying down a general prohibition to
the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws
and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this respect
a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules...",,110 The Lotus case, however, addressed conduct
that had occurred on the high seas. In the antitrust context, effectsbased jurisdiction would lead to the regulation of conduct that had
taken place within the territory of another nation. This distinction
generated additional debate about whether in such a situation domestic effects could create a basis for legislative jurisdiction
consistent with international law, or if regulating foreign conduct
would violate the territorial sovereignty of the other nation involved. 11 1 Some commentators suggested that a "prohibitive rule," in
the form of customary international law, barred nations from legislating foreign conduct on the basis of its local effects. 1 2 Others
argued that domestic effects would be sufficient as a basis for regulation only if some other connecting factor created a link to the
regulating state. 1 3 The majority view, however, was that jurisdiction
109. See Heinz-Peter Mansel, Staatlichkeit des Internationalen Privatrechts und
Volkerrecht, in VOLKERRECHT UND IPR 89, 94 (Stefan Leible & Matthias Ruffert eds.,
2006) (arguing that even in a system in which states are no longer viewed as the sole
subjects of international law, the basic function of international law in limiting the
claims to sovereignty made by individual states remains viable).
110. Lotus, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.J. Series A, No. 10, p. 19.
111. See Rudolf Dolzer, ExtraterritorialeAnwendung von nationalem Recht aus der
Sicht des Vlkerrechts, BITBURGER GESPRACHE JAHRBUCH 2003, 71, 79 (2003) (hereinafter Dolzer, ExtraterritorialeAnwendung) (noting that because the Lotus decision
involved conduct on the high seas, it left open the question whether, in the case of

conduct occurring in another state, the territorial sovereignty of that state might not
be a "prohibitive rule" preventing extraterritorial application).
112. See

JORGEN SCHWARZE, DIE JURISDIKTIONSABGRENZUNG

IM VOLKERRECHT

17-

18 (1994) (providing a brief summary of the German commentary for and against this

proposition).

113. See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, Conflicts Resulting From the Extra-Territorial
Effects of the Antitrust Legislation of Different Countries,in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CoNFLICTs LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 432, 437
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based on effects within Germany satisfied international law. 114 In
1979, the Bundesgerichtshof explicitly accepted the validity of effects
jurisdiction under international law, rejecting, essentially without
discussion, the argument that the scope of German law did not en15
compass foreign conduct.'
Analysis then turned to the question of whether the application
of German competition law to foreign conduct was limited in situations involving conflict with foreign regulatory interests. This issue
too was framed as one of international law: commentators asked
whether the existence of sufficient effects was the only requirement
international law imposed, or whether, in cases of actual or potential
conflict with other jurisdictions, international law required more.
Early scholarship suggested that it did not. Schwartz, for instance,
stated that international law had nothing to say on this point, arguing instead that courts and agencies should simply be considerate of
the interests of competing states.1 1 6 He suggested a range of soft-law
norms that might be useful, including reciprocity and comity (and the
long-term self interest in cooperation), 1 17 but derived no binding
norms from international law.
Rehbinder reached a similar conclusion. Unlike Schwartz, he did
identify as relevant a particular international law principle: the prohibition against abuse of rights. He suggested that this general
principle of international law could lead to the conclusion that statutes should, in cases of doubt, be interpreted in a way that would
interfere as little as possible with the international order. 1 18 He did
not, however, find the principle a sufficiently concrete basis for an
actual requirement that the regulating state consider the interests of
another state. 11 9 Rather, Rehbinder concluded that the rule required
(a) that the transaction in question have some connection to the Ger(Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961) (arguing that, in addition to domestic effects,
some other link would be required, such as the participation of a domestic company or

the implementation of some conduct within the territory of the regulating state).
114. REHBINDER, supra note 32, at 64 (concluding that the effects principle as such
did not violate international law). See also Walter Rudolf, in TERRITORIALE GRENZEN
DER STAATLICHEN RECHTSETZUNG 18 (Walter Rudolf & Walter S. Habscheid eds., 1973)
(concluding that states have the authority to apply their norms to persons or transactions beyond their borders); KARL M. MEESSEN, VOLKERRECHTLICHE GRUNDSATZE DES

227 (1975) (noting that the effects basis is superior
to the conduct basis in that it identifies situations in which the regulating state has a
INTERNATIONALEN KARTELLRECHTS

real regulatory interest); MENG, supra note 39, at 87.
115. OrganicPigments, supra note 38 (rejecting the argument that domestic public
law cannot apply to conduct occurring in a foreign country). See discussion in Gerber,
German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 772-73.
116. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 274.
117. Id. at 281.
118. REHBINDER, supra note 32, at 102.
119. Id. at 104. See generally Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 5 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) (discussing the lack
of agreement on the significance and application of the principle).
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man market and (b) that the law's application not lead to unfair
results. 120 In articulating the connection between these components,
however, he suggested that the existence of direct and substantial
effects within Germany would suffice to satisfy the fairness requirement12 1-in other words, given the presence of such effects, the fact
that other states' interests were involved would be irrelevant. He
therefore characterized the consideration of foreign interests more as
an international relations exercise than as a mandate of international law.1 2 2 Other commentators followed Rehbinder in concluding
that the doctrine required nothing more than sufficient domestic effects, 1 23 and it ultimately played only a minor role in German
jurisdictional analysis.
Later commentators, perhaps in light of the increasing activity
in international antitrust regulation, 24 suggested that other international law norms might be relevant in cases involving foreign
conduct. These included not only the basic principle of sovereign
equality, 12 5 but also the principle of proportionality 26 and the rule of
non-intervention in foreign states.' 2 7 In the late 1970s, the latter
gained prominence in jurisdictional analysis. Before that time, most
commentators had concluded that the non-intervention principle did
not mandate a particular hierarchy of jurisdictional authority (for in120. REHBINDER, supra note 32, at 65.
121. Id. at 91 (stating that a "serious interference" with local competition conditions was required).
122. Id. at 105. He maintains this position in his commentary in IMMENGA!
MESTMACKER, supra note 28; see § 130 Abs. 2, 2707 (n23) (stating that the principle
prohibits only serious disproportion between domestic regulatory interest and the
harm caused to another state; thus, it leaves states quite a bit of room in choosing
criteria triggering application of their law, and in applying and enforcing it). See also
Ernst Steindorff, Verwaltungsrecht, Internationales,in 3 WORTERBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 581 (Karl Strupp & Hans-Juirgen Schlochauer eds., 1962) (describing such
consideration as a principle of international relations, not to be confused with a principle of international law); Dotzer, ExtraterritorialeAnwendung, supra note 111
(concluding that the consideration of foreign interests appears not to have reached the
status of customary international law).
123. See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 29, at 93; Rudolf, supra note 114, at 19 (rejecting the principle as insufficiently accepted and of insufficient precision to be
useful). Cf. Jennings, supra note 24, at 153 ("The position can be expressed in terms of
the doctrine of abuse of rights. A State has a right to extraterritorial jurisdiction
where its legitimate interests are concerned but the right may be abused, and it is
abused when it becomes essentially an interference with the exercise of the local territorial jurisdiction.").
124. Gerber suggests that the increased activities of German regulators in the area
of merger control led to this shift. Gerber, GermanAntitrust, supra note 30, at 765.
125. See HANS-JORG ZIEGENHAIN, EXTRATERRITORIALE RECHTSANWENDUNG UND DIE
BEDEUTUNG DES GENUINE-LINK-ERFORDERNISSES: EiNE DARSTELLUNG DER DEUTSCHEN
UND AMERIKANISCHEN STAATENPRAXIS 22 (1992) (stating that the limits of a state's

legislative jurisdiction must be determined primarily in accordance with the principle
of sovereign equality).

126. See IMMENGA/MESTMACKER, supra note 28, at T 22.
127. See ZIEGENHAIN, supra note 125, at 30 (describing this as the most important
limitation on extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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stance, by requiring a rule of territoriality as the paramount basis of
jurisdiction). They concluded that it was simply impossible to derive
a specific test from such a general principle of international law, as it
failed to provide specific substantive content to a conflicts norm. 128 In
a 1975 book on the international law aspects of competition regulation, 129 however, Karl Meessen asserted on the basis of the nonintervention principle that international law affirmatively required
some form of interest balancing: that "the governmental interests of
the regulating state will suffice to justify the exercise of jurisdiction,
unless the governmental interests of the foreign state significantly
outweigh them." 130 At least in the area of competition regulation, he
argued, this principle had consistent content sufficient to warrant its
31
application as customary international law.'
German case law essentially adopted Meessen's views on the application of the principle of non-intervention in determining
legislative jurisdiction. Two cases in particular demonstrate the role
of international law in defining the outer reach of German competition law. In the Synthetic Rubber case, 13 2 decided in 1980, a German
court for the first time addressed the role of international law in a
situation of direct conflict between German and foreign regulatory
interests. The case arose out of a proposed acquisition involving the
French subsidiaries of two multinational corporations. The proposed
merger was lawful in France and approved by the French government; the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) nevertheless barred it
on the basis of adverse domestic effects. The FCO had admitted that
the merger's "center of gravity" lay outside Germany, however, and
the court turned to the question whether the GWB should apply
when the principal impact of the acquisition would be felt abroad. It
began with the proposition that general rules of international law, by
virtue of Article 25 GG, took precedence over domestic legislation. Referring to the rule of non-intervention, it then held that international
law required "reasonable" forum contacts in order to support the exercise of jurisdiction. Noting that the FCO's bar would prevent the
merger from occurring, and would therefore make itself felt in an128. See Steindorff, supra note 122. Steinberger too suggests that "the principle of
non-intervention as such is considered to be too abstract to determine limits of jurisdiction without further specifications." Steinberger, supra note 29, at 92.
129. MEESSEN, supra note 114.
130. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
131. Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust JurisdictionUnder Customary InternationalLaw,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 804 (1984) (hereinafter Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction)
(describing it as a "relatively precise rule of law" in the antitrust context); see also
Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 62 (1987) (arguing that an obligationto defer "to foreign States
whose interests in the matter have more weight" was established as a rule of customary international law in the antitrust field); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary InternationalLaw, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 665 (1986).
132. KG 26 Nov. 1980, WuW/E OLG 2411 (Synthetic Rubber).
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other country, it held that international law prohibited legislative
jurisdiction in the case despite the planned transaction's effects in
Germany. 133 In defining the reasonableness of the link between the
transaction and German interests, then, it took into account the comparative strength of the transaction's connections with another
nation.
In the Cigarettes case,1 3 4 a later court discussed in more detail
the application of the international law rule against intervention.
That case involved a U.S. company's purchase of a fifty percent stake
in a British company whose own German subsidiary was a competitor
of the buyer. The FCO barred the acquisition on the basis that it
would lead to the strengthening of a market-dominant position in
Germany. In doing so, it recognized the non-intervention principle,
but argued that because the foreign interests at stake were merely
private property interests, no "true" governmental interests had been
invoked that would be infringed by its blocking of the merger. 135 In
reviewing the FCO's action, the German court returned to the doctrine of non-intervention. It held that the FCO had improperly
blocked the entire transaction; in its view, prohibiting the German
subsidiary from being brought within the control of its U.S. competitor was sufficient.1 36 Thus, although the transaction as a whole
clearly presented reasonable links to the German forum, applying
German law to bar the entire foreign acquisition would nevertheless
violate international law if a narrower application of that law, limited to the domestic effects, was possible.1 3 7 More recent cases too
demonstrate the currency of international law principles in analyzing
the scope of German competition law. In one 2003 case, for example,
the FCO reviewed a planned acquisition by a Japanese company of a
French company.138 The FCO noted that the economic effects of the
acquisition would be felt predominantly in Germany, and asserted
that the application of German competition law was therefore proper.
It was on the basis of international law that the applicants contested
this assertion of jurisdiction, maintaining that the FCO's failure to
consider France's asserted interest in the acquisition violated cus1 39
tomary international law.
133. See discussion of the case in Steinberger, supra note 29, at 85; Gerber, German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 774-75.
134. FC, 24 Feb. 1982, WuW/E BkartA 1943 (1983).

135. See discussion in Steinberger, supra note 29, at 88; Gerber, GermanAntitrust,
supra note 30, at 776-79. The FCO further argued that the principle of abuse of right
did not apply, since there was no "blatant disproportion" between the domestic regulatory interest and the harm suffered by the regulated entities.
136. KG 1 July 1983, WuW/E OLG 3051. See also discussion in Meessen, Antitrust
Jurisdiction,supra note 131, at 800; Steinberger, supra note 29, at 89.
137. See ZIEGENHAIN, supra note 125, at 128.
138. FCO 2 May 2003, B 3 - 24410 - U - 8/03.
139. The applicants did not prevail with this argument.
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Whether this international law framework has led to the establishment of clear and predictable rules on the GWB's applicability in
cases of conflict can be debated. 140 What is evident, though, is that
because of it, territorial sovereignty has remained at the center of
German jurisdictional analysis. This does not necessarily mean that
the German system remains focused on territory as the source of legislative power, in the historical sense. 14 1 Indeed, the rule of nonintervention itself can be described as aimed "at the protection of sovereignty, less in the territorial sense, and more in the sense of
recognizing 'the equal right of each nation to preserve its authority.' 1

42

But a system that looks to international law in analyzing

legislative jurisdiction adopts not an inward perspective, focusing on
the furtherance of domestic legislative interests, but an outward one,
focusing on the organization of the international regulatory community.1 43 This approach necessarily preserves a strong connection
between territory and regulatory authority, 14 4 retaining the sense
and purpose of the old territoriality principle, if not its strict parameters. As Rudolf Dolzer characterizes it, the value of the territoriality
principle is not that it leads to specific rules for the resolution of jurisdictional conflict, but that it reflects the duty of each state to
14 5
respect its neighbors' right to autonomous regulation.
It is important in connection with this outward orientation of
German jurisdictional law that the German system also explicitly
turned away from a private conflict-of-laws paradigm in addressing
conflicts of regulatory jurisdiction. In the 1930s, Karl Neumeyer developed a structural approach to conflicts of regulatory law that drew
on the private international law model, in the form of a comprehensive theory of international administrative law (internationales
Verwaltungsrecht).14 6 In the sense used here, this is a body of law
meant to determine the sphere of applicability of various forms of ad140. See Gerber, German Antitrust, supra note 30, at 782-83 (suggesting that the
German system would yield clearer results than that of the United States).
141. See generally KLAUS VOGEL, DER RAUMLICHE ANWENDUNGSBEREICH DER
VERWALTUNGSRECHTSNORM 91-97 (1965) (discussing the historical development of the
territoriality principle and the break, with Savigny and the Nationstaat movement,
from strict territoriality), 142 (concluding that the territoriality principle is most often
used to express either a general concept of the legal regulatory order or a postulate of
international relations).
142. BECK, supra note 108, at 128, quoting MEESSEN, supra note 114, at 202.
143. See, e.g., Dolzer, ExtraterritorialeAnwendung, supra note 111, at 76 (describing the function of international law in this respect as securing a functional
coexistence and minimizing disputes about the allocation of power and resources).
144. In a 1959 case, the Bundesgerichtshof stated that "the idea of territoriality
resides within the rules determining regulatory competence." BGH 17.12.1959, BGHZ
31, 367, 371.
145. See Dolzer, ExtraterritorialeAnwendung, supra note 111, at 81.
146. KARL NEUMEYER, 4 INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1936). See also VoGEL, supra note 141, at 176-86 (discussing Neumeyer's theory).
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ministrative law in the international arena.147 Neumeyer's intent
was to delineate a body of domestic law that would resolve conflicts of
public administrative law much as domestic conflict-of-laws rules resolved conflicts of private law. Analysis would begin in each case with
an examination of the particular regulatory purpose of a given administrative norm. Only if examination of the norm's regulatory
purpose did not sufficiently clarify its extraterritorial reach would international administrative law look to general principles in order to
determine the norm's proper scope. 14 8 This approach shares certain
characteristics with interest analysis in the United States, as it
would look inward, to the domestic policy embodied in regulatory law,
rather than outward to the international community.
However, the theory never gained much traction, 149 and international administrative law never matured into a systematic approach
capable of defining the reach of all German regulatory law. 150 Some
critics, including Frederick A. Mann, rejected the entire project outright, along with its conceptual basis in private-law systems. 1 51
Consistent with that position, German commentators have also declined to integrate private international law methodology more
generally into thinking about regulatory law. Ivo Schwartz and
Jirgen Basedow state the difference as follows:
Private international law method... is based on the principle that a foreign legal system is of equal value with the law
of the forum, and an effort is made to refer every situation to
the legal system with which it is most closely connected ....
In contrast, modern laws prohibiting restrictive business
practices have been enacted essentially in the public interest
of a specific state exercising a market regulatory function
... . [Thus,] the international competition law of a given
147. In other words, the phrase was not meant to describe the substantive law
developed and applied by international bodies. See Klaus Vogel, Administrative Law,
InternationalAspects, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
119, 22, at 24 (describing it in this sense as "a law of administrative conflicts of law, in
other words an administrative law parallel to private international law."). Similarly,
Werner Meng describes it as a domestic public-law conflicts regime. MENG, supra note
39, at 222.
148. See VOGEL, supra note 141, at 382.
149. Vogel, supra note 147, at 24 ("[Neumeyer's theory] has failed to find adherents
outside Germany or even in the German literature on administrative law.").
150. See VOGEL, supra note 141 (concluding that no free-standing substantive international administrative law can be identified; rather, conflicts principles have to
be built into each substantive administrative norm separately). Accord MENG, supra
note 39, at 223.
151. Frederick A. Mann, Conflict of Laws and Public Law, 132 RECUEIL DES COURS
107, 118 (1971-I) ("Under the perhaps unfortunate influence of Karl Neumeyer's
[work] it has become widespread practice in Germany (though probably nowhere else)
to assert the existence of a branch of law which, in regard to public law, is intended to
develop rules and to perform functions that, in the sphere of private law, correspond
to private international law. In truth no such rules exist.").
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state does not act as a neutral arbitrator between the substantive competition law of a foreign state and the law of the
forum; . . . [and] the general principles of private interna152
tional law thus do not extend to competition law.

Thus, while the U.S. system has come to rely on private choiceof-law analysis as a conceptual framework for analyzing legislative
jurisdiction, the German system has not taken the same inward turn.
Rather, it remains focused on the external architecture of the international system.
2. The International Enforcement Lens
Most modern competition laws, including the laws of Germany
and the United States, have a hybrid character. They combine criminal law aspects (e.g., providing for penal sanctions in certain
situations), private-law aspects (e.g., creating certain rights for parties to private agreements, or for parties injured by anticompetitive
conduct), and administrative law aspects (e.g., vesting regulatory
oversight in public agencies). 153 Fundamentally, though, their nature
is that of public regulatory law, enacted by governments seeking to
54
maintain certain conditions of competition within their markets.
In the United States, unlike in most countries, competition enforcement has from the beginning been a true blend of public and
private activity. On the public side, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice implements U.S. antitrust law through civil and
criminal proceedings; the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Competition conducts administrative review and investigations, particularly in the area of mergers, and also has authority to initiate
certain civil proceedings. 155 Substantial enforcement, however, is
achieved on the private side, in the form of civil actions brought by
private attorneys general-individuals or businesses that have incurred harm as the result of anti-competitive behavior. 15 6 In the
United States, therefore, the question of legislative scope arises not
only in the context of direct state action against violators, but also in
152. Ivo E. Schwartz & Jurgen Basedow, Restrictions on Competition, in INTERNAch. 35, at 8-9 (1995); see also
conflicts of laws from conflicts
of states' regulatory interests); Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a
Crossroads:An Intersection Between Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 280 (1982) (criticizing the U.S. Restatement approach for conflating the two
sets of principles).
153. See generally Schwartz & Basedow, supra note 152, at 4.
154. Id. at 8 (noting that such laws "have been enacted essentially in the public
interest of a specific state exercising a market regulatory function.").
155. See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, 2 ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (2d. ed. 2001) (outlining the U.S. enforcement structure).
156. The Clayton Act provides for such litigation. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. III,
MENG, supra note 39, at 87 (distinguishing "ordinary"
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the context of ordinary civil litigation between private parties. Indeed, much of U.S. jurisdictional law in the antitrust arena has been
developed
in decisions addressing claims brought by private plain15 7
tiffs.

This orientation has colored the U.S. view on the reach of

domestic competition law, as it decouples the inquiry regarding that
law's scope from the issue of the state's enforcement power. While the
courts are of course aware of the public regulatory goals underpinning private antitrust litigation, they do not in such cases directly
confront acts by state agencies themselves, and tend to focus instead
on the ordinary remedial interests at stake. 158 The fact that private
civil litigation often provides the procedural context for considering
prescriptive jurisdiction reinforces the turn toward domestic, privatelaw models to analyze regulatory limits.
The extent to which the private-enforcement paradigm has affected the U.S. approach to legislative scope is illustrated in the
decision in U.S. v. Nippon Paper.159 That case arose out of a conspiracy by a Japanese corporation to fix the prices of thermal fax paper
sold in the United States. It was not a civil action for damages but
rather a criminal action, and the court addressed whether U.S. antitrust law applied in the criminal context to conduct that had taken
place entirely abroad. The First Circuit answered this question in the
affirmative, taking only two interpretive steps. First, it concluded
that Hartford Fire Insurance had "conclusively establishe[d] that
civil antitrust actions predicated on wholly foreign conduct which has
an intended and substantial effect in the United States come within
[the Sherman Act's] jurisdictional reach."' 60 Second, noting that civil
and criminal claims are "based on the same language in the same
section of the same statute,"' 6 1 it applied ordinary canons of statutory construction to conclude that the Act's legislative scope was the
same in both contexts. Although the court included a brief discussion
of comity, it simply accepted the decision in Hartford Fire Insurance
that such considerations were irrelevant. 6 2 Thus, even in a case involving prosecutorial action by the U.S. government itself, for a crime
no constituent element of which took place in the United States, the
16 3
matter was framed as a question of domestic statutory intent.
157. This is not always the case: both the Alcoa and HartfordFireInsurance cases,
for example, involved state proceedings.
158. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global
Age: Public Interests in Private InternationalAntitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L.
219 (2001) (discussing the balance of compensatory and deterrent goals in private
antitrust litigation).
159. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).

160. Id. at 4.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 8.
163. The case is also interesting in that it completes the circle begun in Alcoa.
There, to support his conclusion that effects-based jurisdiction was proper, Judge
Hand cited a number of criminal conspiracy cases holding that U.S. legislation could

2009]

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

Only in a concurring opinion did one judge suggest that principles of
international law were relevant, and "requir[e] examination beyond
the language of ... the Sherman Act." Expressing a view not shared

by the majority, he stated that "where international law suggests
that criminal enforcement and civil enforcement be viewed differently, it is at least conceivable that different content could be
ascribed to the same language depending on whether the context is
civil or criminal. It is then worth asking about the effect of the inter16 4
national law which Congress presumably also meant to respect."
In Germany, by contrast, enforcement of competition law is
viewed as a matter of public regulation. The Federal Cartel Office is
charged with the primary implementation and enforcement of the

GWB. 16 5 The GWB historically provided only in very limited circum-

stances for private civil actions in connection with antitrust
violations, 16 6 and such actions played essentially no role in German
competition regulation. 16 7 German cases and commentary therefore
viewed the enforcement of domestic competition law almost exclusively as an exercise of regulatory authority by state agencies. 168
Only recently has the role of private enforcement begun to expand, as
a result of the 2005 enactment of the Seventh Amendment to the Law

reach conduct that took place largely abroad, as long as a constituent element of the
relevant offense occurred in the United States. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. Here, in holding that U.S. legislation reached criminal conduct taking place
entirely abroad, the First Circuit cited the civil cases that had flowed from Alcoa.
164. Id. at 10 (Lynch, J., concurring). While that opinion recognized that international law might require different treatment in criminal cases, however, it concluded
that the particular facts nevertheless justified regulation.
165. GWB § 48 (reserving competence for the agencies of the individual
Bundeslinder in situations presenting no national dimension). The Monopoly Commission, consisting of five members appointed by the federal government, provides
opinions on issues of competitive conditions. GWB § 44, 45.
166. Prior to the 2005 revisions, GWB § 33 provided that a party harmed by unlawful conduct could recover damages in private litigation only if the conduct had
violated a provision intended to protect a specific individual interest, rather than the
general public. Thus, anticompetitive conduct that affected an entire market could
not give rise to private lawsuits. The requirement that the violation relate to a provision "serving to protect another" was traditionally read extremely restrictively. See
RAINER BECHTOLD, KARTELLGESETZ, GESETZ GEGEN WEIrrBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN

348-49 (2002). As a result, private damages actions were rare. See Karl Wach et al.,
Executive Summary and Overview, National Report for Germany, in Study on the
Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules
(Ashurst Report) (2004), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actions
damages.study.html, at 1 (concluding at the time of writing that damages "have only
been awarded in very few cases").
167. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of
Competition Law: A HistoricalPerspective on the Expansion of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 474, 493 (2005) (discussing reasons for lack of
private litigation).
168. See RERBINDER, supra note 32, at 241 (noting that the public administrative
aspects of the GWB take precedence over the aspects relating to private rights).
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Against Restraints on Competition. 16 9 That statute introduced significant changes, both substantive and procedural, in order to
strengthen private enforcement of competition law. 170 In some respects, however, the amended statute continues to recognize the
subsidiarity of private enforcement to public regulation, 17 1 and it remains to be seen to what extent the changes will overcome the
various procedural hurdles to private litigation.
These differences in enforcement patterns have important consequences. In the German system the question of extraterritorial
legislative reach is considered against the backdrop of independent
limitations on cross-border enforcement activity by states-in other
words, the issue of how far national competition laws reach is always
intertwined with the issue of the enforcement of those laws outside
the territory of the enacting state. While the legitimacy and parameters of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction remain contested, the
law is clearer on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction: no state
may engage in an act of coercion in the territory of another state
without the latter's consent. 172 In many cross-border cases involving
the potential violation of national competition law, the necessary administrative investigations and proceedings will involve public acts
touching foreign jurisdictions. These may include the service of process abroad, the issuance of orders to produce documentary evidence
located abroad, and the taking of oral testimony from witnesses located abroad. 173 As acts of public authorities, these can take place on
foreign soil only with the consent of the other state involved. 174 In the

German view, this is true even when such procedures are taken in
the context of private litigation rather than public administrative ac169. Siebtes Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen,
English version available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglischCompetition
Act/CompAct.shtml. For an overview of the amendment, see Andreas M. Klees, Breaking the Habits: The German Competition Law after the 7th Amendment to the Act
againstRestraints of Competition (GWB), 7 GERMAN L.J. 399 (2006).
170. See Klees, supra note 169, at 416. This move to strengthen private enforcement was taken parallel to similar developments at the Community level.
171. One section, for instance, provides that when multiple purchasers are harmed
by an infringement, an industry association can bring a claim for disgorgement of the
benefit received. That amount will be remitted to the government, however; in addition, if the FCO chooses to address the matter by imposing a fine, such an action is
foreclosed. GWB § 34a(1).
172. This is recognized in U.S. doctrine as well-while public international law
limits embodying this kind of territorialism have faded in other areas, they do remain
in U.S. doctrine primarily with this sort of direct action.
173. See Brenda Sufrin, Competition Law in a Globalised Marketplace:Beyond Jurisdiction, in ASSERTING JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 105 (Patrick Capps et al. eds., 2003) ("[Mlerely taking legislative (prescriptive) jurisdiction ...is not enough. The crucial point is whether a State also has
enforcement jurisdiction whereby its authorities can take evidence, conduct investigations, serve proceedings and recover penalties abroad.").
174. BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 309.
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tion.175 Enforcement in cross-border actions is thus seen against the

backdrop of classic territorial sovereignty, with the concern being
illegitimate interthat the implementation of the GWB will17involve
6
ference in the territory of another nation.
It is recognized in the German system that the application of domestic law on the basis of domestic effects does not necessarily
involve extraterritorial enforcement in this sense. That is, if the FCO
applies the GWB in a German proceeding to prohibit the acquisition
of a German company in a transaction that, while consummated
abroad, would create an unlawful monopoly in Germany, that does
not involve a public act taken in the territory of another state: it involves merely the application of local public law to a private
transaction. 177 Thus, the German system does not view the question
of extraterritorial legislation as entirely coterminous with the question of extraterritorial enforcement. 178 However, because
enforcement of the GWB is a public process, German commentators
are much more attuned to the limits of local power in implementing
any prohibitions on foreign conduct through extraterritorial application.1 7 9 This awareness of limits on enforcement puts another frame
around their expansion of effects-based jurisdiction, as it highlights
the fact that the application of the GWB is a public regulatory act
that touches other nations.' 8 0
C. Contextualizing the U.S. and German Approaches
The different models developed in Germany and the United
States to address the issue of legislative jurisdiction have their roots
in, and reflect, larger differences between the two systems. Consider,
for instance, the relationship between the United States and Ger175. BASEDOW, supra note 107, at 32-33. This is important also because it will remain true even given the strengthening of the private action in EU law, which will
continue to rely on national civil procedure systems.
176. See ZIEGENHAIN, supra note 125, at 128-29 (arguing that jurisdiction to prescribe cannot be analyzed independent of jurisdiction to enforce; thus, the reach of
German competition law is dependent in part on the extent of the intervention in
foreign systems); JOACHIM BERTELE, SOUVERANITAT UND VERFAHRENSRECHT 101-02
(1998).
177. See HANS-JORGEN SCHLOCHAUER, DIE EXTRATERRITORIALE WIRKUNG VON
HOHEITSAKTEN 41-42 (1962) (distinguishing between state action that interferes directly with the territorial sovereignty of another nation and state action, like that
permitted by GWB § 130(2), that affects private transactions concluded pursuant to
foreign law).
178. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 247.
179. See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 29, at 94 (noting that § 130(2) "does not
claim extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction in the sense that it empowers German
cartel authorities or courts to render acts on foreign territory.").
180. See Jirgen Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht:Theoretischer Versuch iber
die ordnungspolitischenNormen des Forumstaates,52 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 8, 25 (1988) (describing the linkage
in the German system between the substantive norms and their procedural
enforceability).
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many in the antitrust context itself. The post-war years created
fundamentally different social understandings of the linkage between
territory and economic control. For the United States, the post-war
period brought the exportation of domestic law outside the borders of
the country-not through extraterritorial application of U.S. law, but
more directly, through the imposition of Allied law during the period
of German occupation.18 1 This experience may have given the United
States a view of its activities in this regard as a sort of benevolent
imposition of norms onto other territories, a pattern that was followed through into the period of European integration.' 8 2 Thus, the
later rejection under jurisdictional law of hard international law limits, and the adoption of a method of analysis focused on national
interests, may have drawn on and reinforced the tradition of outward
extension of domestic regulatory law. From the German perspective,
of course, the development of national competition law during the
post-war years was experienced entirely differently, l8 3 and laid the
groundwork for later insistence on the prerogatives of the country's
14
regained sovereignty.
The role of international law itself, as related to the question of
law's scope, may also be constructed and experienced differently
within the two systems. As one public international law scholar put
it, "The word 'territorium,' around which the concepts of territoriality
and extraterritoriality are oriented, was used by Grotius not only to
refer to territory in the geographical sense, but also to the sphere
within which state jurisdiction exists."1 8 5 The more unlinked the
sphere of regulatory authority is to geographical territory, however,
the greater the possibility of discord among neighbors. Germany has
had the experience both of imposing norms beyond its territory and
suffering the imposition of foreign norms. After the war, as previously noted, the occupation laws, with their foreign content, were
imposed on the country through direct intervention. Earlier, though,
in the years leading up to the war, the Grofraum theory had sought
to justify a form of international law resting not on the territorial
integrity of sovereign states but rather on their spheres of influence 8 6-a theory that conflicted categorically with the notion of
181. See Buxbaum, supra note 167, at 476-80.
182. See id. at 481-82.
183. See Walter S. Habscheid, in TERRITORIALE GRENZEN, supra note 114, at 57
(discussing the perception that the "quasi-missionary impulse" underlying U.S. cartel
politics was insufficient rationalization for the extraterritorial extension of U.S. law).
184. See generally TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930-2004
246-62 (2006) (describing antitrust policy during the Allied occupation of Germany);
cf. Janet McLean, From Empire to Globalization: The New Zealand Experience, 11
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 161 (2004) (examining questions of sovereignty and
power from the perspective of a country emerging from colonial rule).
185. Rudolf, supra note 114, at 33.
186. See generally CARL ScHMiTT, VOLKERRECHTLICHE GRO13RAUMORDNUNG MIT INTERVENTIONSVERBOT FOR RAUMFREMDE MACHTE: EIN BEITRAG zuM REICHSBEGRIFF FOR
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formal equality among nation-states.' 8 7 It is not surprising, then,
that the German system later adopted a more territory-focused system of jurisdictional authority as a reaction to such developments.

Indeed, Article 25 of the Grundgesetz, whose elevation of international law above municipal law largely created the international
law focus analyzed above, was adopted in 1949 as an expression of
Germany's expectations regarding its membership in the international community.' 8 8 One constitutional historian describes the
process as follows:
[O]n the international plane, [National Socialism] meant a
claim for absolute sovereignty, not restricted by treaties ...
not even restricted by respect for the sovereignty of the other
members of the international community, thus destroying

the very principle of self-determination of peoples which had
been so persistently demanded for Germany herself .... After the very short interval of this nationalism gone mad
(1933-1945), after the relatively short interval of the predominance of the idea of absolute sovereignty not derived
from the true German tradition (1871-1945), Germany has
to try to build up a system of restrictions of national sovereignty . . . [After 1945,1 a new Constitution was drafted to
amend the errors of the past and to embody the lessons

taught by the collapse of a system which had embodied the
most reckless abuse of power ever known in German constitutional history.' 8 9
VOLKERRECHT (1939); see also CARL SCHMITT, THE NoMos OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF Jus PUBLICUM EuRoPAEUM 1950 (G.L. Ulmen trans. 2006).
187. See Detlev F. Vagts, InternationalLaw in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
661 (1990) (describing the theory that hegemony, based on the strength of a powerful
political idea, gives a state the right to interfere in internal matters of subordinate
states in order to effectuate that idea); Christian Joerges, Europe a Grolraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisationsof the Integration Project, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW
IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOcIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS

LEGAL TRADITIONS 171 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003) ("The
Grofpraum debate Carl Schmitt sparked off in 1939 was, first of all, about the destruction of classical international law."), 171-73 (describing the theory).
188. Its neighboring articles likewise express this aspiration. Article 24 provides in
part that "the Federation may become a party to a system of collective security; in
doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring
about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the
world." GG Art. 24(b) (translation in KOMMERS, supra note 102, at 511); Article 26,
that "Any activities apt or intended to disturb peaceful international relations, especially preparation for military aggression, shall be unconstitutional." GG Art. 26(1)
(translation in KOMMERS at 511). See Koenig, supra note 103, at Art. 25 Rdnr. 12
(describing these articles as "the expression and central element of the constitutional
decision in favor of international cooperation and a tendency in the Basic Law
friendly to international law").
189. F.J. Berber, German Law, in SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 79, 86-87 (Arthur
Larson & C. Wilfred Jenks, eds. 1965).
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In the German system, then, restoring territorial limits to the
conception of sovereignty was a deliberate choice. 190 It has both a
limiting dimension (acting as a control on the nation's own exercise of
power) and a protective dimension (acting as a defense against imposition by others). In both directions, the focus on territoriality serves
to establish a concrete method of delimiting power-and it is a focus
of direct relevance to jurisdictional rules. Writing in 1965, Klaus Vogel pointed to the "world open" system established in post-war
Germany, noting that it deliberately emphasized international cooperation and integration in the world community. He viewed this as
the source of a general principle favoring restrictive rather than ag19 1
gressive interpretation of the scope of German regulatory law.
The net result is that the claims of jurisdictional authority, or of
resistance to the exercise of authority, made within these respective
systems draw their content and meaning not only from the competition law context, but from broader aspects of the legal regimes. Thus,
while German commentators, like their U.S. counterparts, recognize
the historical contingency of sovereignty in the Westphalian sense, as
well as the challenges posed by globalization, they do not generally
draw from this recognition the conclusion that jurisdictional law
should be detached from territorial sovereignty. As illustrated above,
at least in the context of prescriptive jurisdiction, current German
law is more entrenched in the public international law framework
than U.S. law, and so territoriality remains a much more relevant
and immediate concept there.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

To a significant degree, it is the forces we discuss under the
heading of globalization that suggest the need to reshape jurisdictional law. The "borderless" nature of some activities, the near-global
nature of others-all of this seems to demand regulatory solutions
freed from territorial underpinnings. Similarly, the multidisciplinary
retheorization of territory and power in the global age supports and
promotes the development of "global" theories of jurisdiction. What
the analysis above seeks to demonstrate is that attention to the individual legal contexts in which claims of regulatory authority are
made, and contested, remains critical to the success of this transition.
This Part argues that uncovering those contexts is necessary, first, to
avoid misunderstandings by the various actors engaged in jurisdic190. See Koenig, supra note 103, at Art. 25 Rdnr. 10 (describing the drafters' intent
to establish a "restrictive" approach in this sense. See also KLAUS VOGEL, DIE VERFASSUNGSENTSCHEIDUNG

DES GRUNDGESETZES FOR EINE INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT

(1964).
191. VOGEL, supra note 141, at 409, 416-18.
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tional determinations, and second, to reveal the full range of values
relevant to emerging theories of jurisdiction.
A.

Recognizing Disjuncture

The rhetoric of territoriality and extraterritoriality dominates
the discourse about conflicts of legislative jurisdiction. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, however, the legal frameworks within
which that rhetoric is used differ from country to country. As a result,
the ways in which jurisdictional claims have been deployed and understood, and the ways in which they have been addressed by the
courts and other actors considering international antitrust cases, reveal real and consequential disjunctures in understanding.
These disjunctures have permeated U.S.-based litigation of international antitrust cases. The U.S. Supreme Court's most recent
international antitrust case, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran,S.A., 192 illustrates them particularly clearly. That case arose
out of the activities of a price-fixing cartel in the vitamins market
that had caused significant adverse effects in the United States and
in many other countries. The plaintiffs were non-U.S. vitamins distributors who had purchased the price-fixed goods in Australia,
Ecuador, Panama and Ukraine; the defendants were international
pharmaceuticals companies incorporated in a number of different
countries. 193 Many foreign governments 1 94 filed briefs as amici curiae in that case, supporting the argument of the defendant
corporations that U.S. antitrust law did not reach the foreign transactions in question. The governments claimed, in the words of one
representative brief, that "basic principles of international law regarding the allocation of jurisdiction between states"'1 9 5 barred the
exercise of legislative jurisdiction by the United States over the foreign conduct in question. That brief, submitted on behalf of the
governments of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands,
went on to state that
the primary ground of jurisdiction which is universally recognized in international law is "territoriality." In accordance
with this principle, a state may exercise its authority to prescribe and enforce its law over all persons and things within
its territory. By contrast a state's authority to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially is much more limited . . . [Tihe
192. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).

193. Id. at 159-60. The original class action included U.S. purchasers as well, but
this decision addressed jurisdiction over the claims of only the foreign purchasers.
194. Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom.
195. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd v. Empagran, S.A., Brief of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2004 WL 226597 at 18 (2004).
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more controversial "effects doctrine" suggests that in certain
circumstances a state may exercise jurisdiction over events
that have a clear effect in its territory, even if the planning
196
and execution takes place elsewhere.
Such claims make little sense if viewed as an assertion by amici
that other countries, on the basis of territorial contacts, had a greater
regulatory interest in the conduct than did the United States. In the
case itself, the transactions in question had not occurred within the
territory of the United Kingdom, Ireland or the Netherlands, but
rather in other countries-none of whose governments made similar
filings indicating hostility to the possibility of U.S.-based litigation.
Thus, amici could hardly assert the "primacy of territoriality" as a
basis for promoting a specific regulatory interest in the case. 19 7 The
claims do, however, make sense as statements relating more generally to the way in which individual nations-in particular, the United
States-exercise their regulatory power in the global arena. What
amici were arguing about, in other words, was not the right of particular countries to regulate the specific transactions in question, but
rather the shape of the international regulatory system. 198
Disjunctures in the debate about jurisdictional reach are echoed,
and reinforced, by a related debate: the so-called Justizkonflikt between Europe and the United States over various aspects of civil
procedure. 199 In that context too, the extent to which territory remains the currency of analysis-and the source of misunderstanding
and disagreement-is evident. In many civil justice systems, functions such as evidence gathering reside within the exclusive purview
of the courts; therefore, unauthorized parties (including private litigants as well as foreign courts) are precluded from engaging in them
within the territory of the relevant state. 20 0 When U.S. litigants or
courts attempt to request or order the production of evidence from
196. Id. at 19.
197. This fact led some to conclude that amici were claiming "extraterritoriality"
simply as a cover for defending their own corporations, an inference not infrequently
drawn in international antitrust cases. See Clifford A. Jones, Foreign Plaintiffs, Vitamins, and the Sherman Antitrust Act After Empagran,EUR. L. REP. JULY/AuGuST 270,
274 (2004).
198. Vaughan Lowe made a similar point about blocking statutes, describing them
"not [as] measures of retorsion or retaliation, but simply formal expressions of a legal
truth ... : that the world is made up of independent sovereign States with sovereign
and inalienable rights to choose their own economic systems." A.V. Lowe, The
Problems of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:Economic Sovereignty and the Search for a
Solution, 34 INr'L COMP. L.Q. 724, 746 (1985). As I have argued, what is "true" in one
system may not be so in others, making it critical to understand the meaning underlying such claims.
199. See generally DER JUSTIZKONFLIKT MIT DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERiKA (Walther J. Habscheid ed., 1986); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 137-39 (1996).
200. See generally PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 55759 (2004).

2009]

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

abroad, they often meet objections framed in terms of "judicial sovereignty" that seek to limit the "extraterritorial" reach of U.S.
procedural mechanisms. Thus, for instance, in Socidtg Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. Dist. Ct.,201 the case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court considered whether U.S. courts could continue to order the discovery of evidence located abroad pursuant to domestic
rules of procedure or were confined to the procedures set forth in a
multilateral treaty, 2 02 the German government grounded its argument in favor of the latter position entirely in public international
law:
[Tihe US Government seriously underestimates the German
Federal Government's resolve concerning German judicial
sovereignty which is embedded in the German constitution,
and therefore, cannot be waived by the government .... The
respect of another country's judicial sovereignty is the very
principle of international law upon which all international
treaties on judicial assistance are based and which the Federal Republic of Germany hoped to see observed by the
United States when becoming a party to the Hague Evidence
Convention .... The Federal Republic of Germany continues
[to urge] a decision taking into account the respect of other
countries' sovereignty which is the fundamental principle on
20 3
which international law is based.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, barely responded to this
point. It began by holding that the evidence-gathering procedures set
forth in the treaty itself were not mandatory. 20 4 Consistent with the
U.S. approach to legislative jurisdiction, it did not then consider
whether customary international law might provide any hard limits
on the application of domestic procedural rules. Rather, it turned to a
consideration of whether "international comity" might at least counsel initial use of the treaty's procedures. It concluded, in language
reminiscent of the Timberlane interest-balancing approach, that comity required a "particularized analysis" in each case of "the respective
interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation."20 5 The
Court then framed those interests not in terms of the international
system, but largely in terms of the private interests involved-on the
201. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).

202. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S.
231.
203. Diplomatic Note presented by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to the U.S. Department of State, April 8, 1986, included as Appendix A to Brief
for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae, Socit Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., available at 1986 WL 727492.
204. 482 U.S. at 539-40.
205. Id. at 543-44.
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U.S. side, the interest of litigants in avoiding "unduly time-consuming and expensive" procedures that would be "less certain to produce
needed evidence" than use of U.S. procedural rules. 20 6 From within
the U.S. conceptual framework, this decision may be seen as at least
an attempt to establish a standard designed to permit the consideration, within the context of ordinary civil litigation, of various
competing interests. 20 7 From within the German conceptual framework, however, it appears as a wholesale repudiation of the
20 8
international regime.
Uncovering the assumptions behind claims of territoriality or extraterritoriality is a critical step in ensuring that the institutions
responsible for weighing such claims-including national courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures-can properly assess the
meaning and force of those claims in instances of conflict. This step is
relevant not only in the context of litigation but also in the legislative
setting. The ongoing dispute between the United States and European countries regarding the desirability of a multilateral antitrust
regime, for instance, reflects different assumptions about the virtue
20 9
of territorial sovereignty as the foundation of a global framework.
The current preference of Germany (and the European Union generally) for bringing antitrust regulation under the WTO umbrella is
consistent with its vision of sovereign equality. 2 10 Conversely, the
United States, accustomed to addressing the issue of regulatory conflict primarily as a matter of domestic interest and policy, may
continue to prefer bilateral and ad-hoc cooperation and coordination
efforts. 211 Understanding the context for such preferences will im206. Id. at 543.
207. Whether the precise standard articulated by the Court in fact provided sufficient guidance to lower courts in performing this balancing is another story. See
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Assessing Sovereign Interests in Cross-Border Discovery Disputes: Lessons from Aerospatiale, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87 (2003) (arguing that it did not).
208. See BERTELE, supra note 176, at 429 (describing the German government's
contention that the decision was inconsistent with international law).
209. See KEVIN C. KENNEDY, COMPETITION LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION: THE LIMITS OF MULTILATERALISM 14-17 (2001) (outlining some of the reasons for
this disagreement).
210. See Dolzer, ExtraterritorialeAnwendung, supra note 111, at 89-90 (advocating
the WTO solution). See also Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction,supra note 131, at 809
(suggesting the development of an "International Centre for Settlement of Antitrust
Disputes," a specialized tribunal addressing controversies arising out of conflicts of

antitrust jurisdiction); discussion infra at note 218 and accompanying text (noting
that less dominant states generally benefit from multilateral frameworks).
211. In its Final Report, issued in 2000, the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
(ICPAC) advocated only a limited role for the WTO in connection with competition
policy. See ICPAC Final Report, Chapter 5, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr
icpac. See also Sufrin, supra note 173, at 124-26 (describing with more optimism the
possibility of U.S. involvement in a multilateral structure for international competition regulation).
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prove the process as alternative regulatory mechanisms are debated
and negotiated.
B.

Territoriality as Artifact? Integration into JurisdictionalTheory

As discussed in the introduction to this Article, current work on
jurisdictional theory investigates the connections between territory,
sovereignty and jurisdiction. Incorporating insights from other disciplines, it intentionally complicates the relationship among those
elements in part to challenge the continued salience of territory in
the construction of jurisdictional rules. That challenge intersects
with the related proposition, flowing from the pluralist insight that
legal norms can be generated not only by states but also by non-state
actors in a variety of settings, 2 12 that territory-bounded nation-states
are not the only relevant actors in jurisdictional debates. 2 13 On this
view, the growing involvement of other actors in jurisdictional determinations-actors, including NGOs, that do not define their own
mandate or the scope of the problems they address by reference to
geographic territory-is another factor that diminishes the role of
territory in jurisdictional law.
In one narrow respect, emerging jurisdictional models do recognize the continued salience of territorialism: in the context of
enforcement. If an assertion of jurisdictional authority is to be enforced, coercive power must be enlisted-and that remains within the
exclusive purview of state actors and is therefore more closely tied to
territoriality. Due to this "reality of territorial enforcement," territorialism in this sense retains relevance in pluralist models. 2 14 Yet
jurisdictional assertions are linked to state action even outside the
narrow context of enforcement, simply because it is often state actors
who mediate conflicting jurisdictional claims. While some jurisdictional assertions made by non-state actors might achieve direct force
within various communities through "jurispersuasional" means,215
212. See generally Michaels, supra note 80, at 1221-24 (surveying studies of legal
pluralism).
213. See Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 319-20 ("Too
often, ... contemporary frameworks for thinking about jurisdictional authority unreflectively accept the assumption that nation-states defined by fixed territorial
borders are the only relevant jurisdictional entities, without examining how people
actually experience allegiance to community or understand their relationship to geographical distance and territorial borders.").
214. Paul Schiff Berman, DialecticalRegulation, Territoriality,and Pluralism,38
CoNN. L. REV. 929, 940 (2006). As Berman goes on to note, the "territorial nexus ...
does not in any way eliminate or delegitimize the transnational or international normative assertion" that may be made by non-state actors.). Id. See also Berman,
Globalization of Jurisdiction,supra note 5, at 323.
215. Berman, supra note 214, at 952 ("The assertion of jurisdiction is the way a
community-any community-seizes the language of law, attempts to construct itself
as a coherent community, offers a norm to regulate that community, and asserts its
'soft' power.").
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many such assertions must pass through the filter of consideration by
state actors, such as national courts, who may in the process reframe
or reconstruct them. Because local understandings of what territorial
sovereignty means form part of that filter, territoriality retains relevance in this sense as well, whether or not enforcement mechanisms
are in play.
More generally, jurisdictional theories must reject the tendency
to present territorial sovereignty as a sort of jurisdictional artifactas the touchstone of an older and no longer terribly useful approach
to resolving regulatory conflict. Viewed from within the United
States system, such a characterization is not particularly jarring; as
the analysis above suggests, the U.S. approach already minimizes the
importance of territory in determining legislative scope. This is not
the case in all systems, however, and attempts to map the connections between territory and jurisdiction on the transnational plane
must account for the conceptual and institutional differences across
legal regimes. The use of territoriality as a mechanical standard used
to link particular conduct with a particular country's law-rightly rejected-must be distinguished from the use of territoriality as an
expression of a specific understanding about fairness and legitimacy
in cross-border regulation. A cosmopolitan jurisdictional model would
reject the construction of community as "a geographically determined
territory circumscribed by fixed boundaries," instead bringing into
view the multiple interests and affiliations that define our sense of
community. 216 Part of the point of that move is to encourage the actors making jurisdictional decisions to replace a focus on internal
domestic policy with a broader focus: to expand the "idea of a government's self-interest ...

to include an interest in being a cooperating

member of the global community." 217 Yet, paradoxically, territorial
sovereignty may be the vehicle used to express precisely such interests in global community. As in the German system, an argument to
retain territorial divisions as the basis for allocating regulatory jurisdiction can be a statement about cooperation and harmony in the
global arena-about the values on which the international community rests, and the terms on which various actors will participate in
the systems of coordination and cooperation that are developing in
2 18
the cross-border regulatory arena.
216. Berman, Globalization of Law, supra note 5, at 322.
217. Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1880

(2005).
218. Thus, within the German system, territorial sovereignty is viewed by various
actors not as undermined by the current pressures on jurisdictional law, but as an
appropriate means of countering those pressures. This position is not peculiar to Germany: reliance on territorial sovereignty in a strict sense helps protect the interests of
less dominant members of the international community against the interests of the
more dominant. As Professor Jennings noted,

2009]

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT

This, then, is the challenge facing jurisdictional law. Dividing the
world into compartments, as Mann put it, is no longer a satisfactory
or even a viable way to conceive of regulating the global economy. It
ignores the diffusion of both the conduct that must be regulated and
also the means by which regulatory authority is asserted in the
global economy. Yet methodological frameworks seeking a basis in
transgovernmental communities, or in community values, must integrate the relevant values that are sometimes expressed through
invocations of territorialism. 2 19 The task will be to generate a conversation about what lies behind claims of "territoriality" and
"extraterritoriality," thereby creating more specific awareness of
what is being contested-not only the power of particular actors to
regulate certain conduct, but the shape of the global regulatory
community.

[The posture that there is no hard legal obligation to refrain from extraterritorial regulation] is a characteristic posture of the "big chap" dealing with the
"little chap." The little chap, on the other hand, looks for rules and expects
and asserts that there must be some to be found in international law.
R.Y. Jennings, The ProperReach of Territorial Jurisdiction:A Case Study of Divergent Attitudes, 2 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. 35, 37 (1972).
219. See Klaus Vogel, intervention in TERRITORIALE GRENZEN, supra note 114, at
83, noting that while international law prohibits only the exercise of sovereign acts on
the territory of another state, states increasingly meet their regulatory ends not
through "official" sovereign acts but through more indirect routes. He goes on to suggest that new categories and new analytical models must be created that bring the
values in classic international law to beai. Id. at 85.
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